APPENDIX 'E': THANATOLOGY: An application of the theory
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Killing - an instance of a flow of conduct from source to recipient in circumstances - has drawn the attention of lawmakers since the dawn of lawmaking. One of the law’s original top ten was, 'Thou shall not kill', which, by the way, is a command for negative conduct (See Row C of the Periodic Table). Even though 'Thou shall not kill' appears unequivocal, there are those who advocate deadly loopholes to the biblical command against killing. In certain circumstances — as barbaric as it sounds — they advocate the permission that 'Thou may kill' (See Row B of the Periodic Table) and the command that 'Thou shall kill' (See Row A of the Periodic Table). The proponents of killing are so fervent in their advocacy that one wonders whether they were given special access to the back of the tablets God gave to Moses on which the exceptions to 'Thou shall not kill' might have been written.
Let us begin our exegesis of thanatology by running the flow of conduct through the factual aspect of A Unified Theory of a Law . Obviously, the conduct is killing. The source of the conduct is a killer. The consequence of killing is death. And the recipient of the consequences of killing is a victim. Hence, the base of THE TRIANGLE OF LAW® consists of a killer, killing, death and a victim. Moreover, A Unified Theory of a Law teaches us that any flow of conduct including killing is mono-directional. It always flows from killer to victim never from victim to killer. In addition, any flow of conduct including killing is binary, having a polarity of either on or off. There is no difference whatsoever between negative and positive killing other than its polarity. What makes one type of killing different than another are the circumstances that surround it.
One of the virtues of THE TRIANGLE OF LAW® is the ability to distinguish the factual from the legal. Much misunderstanding arises when the border between the factual and legal is blurred, the two are confused and you have no idea whether you are "in the legal" or "in the factual".
For example, the benefits and burdens of a law depend on whether you are looking at it from a factual versus a legal point of view. From a legal perspective, a lawmaker’s allocation of weight and standing can be analyzed according to whether the allocation creates a benefit or burden. It can be viewed as a burden when a lawmaker binds a duty to a weight token holder and a benefit when a lawmaker binds a privilege. It can be viewed as a burden when a lawmaker binds a no-right to a standing token holder and a benefit when a lawmaker binds a right.
The legal benefits and burdens, however, do not necessarily correspond to the factual benefits and burdens that arise from a flow of conduct.
Take a look at killing.
The burden of killing, from a factual point of view, is on the victim because, in general, the consequence of killing, death, is bad. Yet, when a lawmaker objects to killing and puts the weight of government on a killer to turn off the flow of killing, from a legal point of view, the burden is on a killer. Thus, factually, the burden is on a victim but, legally, the burden is on a killer. Therefore, it is important to know where you are! Are you "in the factual" or are you "in the legal?"
With this in mind, let us return from our digression to run killing through the legal part of THE TRIANGLE OF LAW®. It is helpful to follow the discussion with the Periodic Table of the Elements of a Law® in hand.
According to the Periodic Table of the Elements of a Law®, there are three permutations into which a lawmaker can incarnate a law towards any flow of conduct including killing. Each of the three permutations is represented on the Periodic Table of the Elements of a Law® by its three rows named, ordinarily enough, Row ‘A’, Row ‘B’, and Row ‘C’.
A Row ‘A’ lawmaker holds the opinion that she likes killing (See, cell ‘A3' of the Periodic Table of the Elements of a Law®). An example of a lawmaker who likes killing is a queen who wants to wage war on her enemies. The opinion prompts a lawmaker to desire to turn on the flow of killing from killer to victim (Cell 'A4') and to express this desire with the issuance of a command that the killing be done, i.e., that the conduct be on. The command is "Thou shall kill" (Cell 'A5'). It is a command for ‘positive’ or ‘on’ conduct (Cell 'A4'). Simultaneously, with the issuance of the command, “Thou shall kill”, a lawmaker binds the command to token holders allocating both weight and standing both of which, by the way, are present in a command. With regard to weight (Column 1), a lawmaker binds the command to a weight token holder by handing him or her a duty (Cell 'A2'). The weight token holder, to continue the same example, might be the soldiers in the queen’s army or even secret assassins in her employ. The weight of the lawmaker is felt as a duty to kill (Cell 'A2'). But what about standing (Column 7)? Standing is the second tool of a lawmaker. It describes whether a lawmaker recognizes or does not recognize the complaints of a standing token holder about a flow of conduct. It too must be bound to a standing token holder when a law is issued. With regard to standing, to whom does a lawmaker bind the command? To whom does a lawmaker hand a right to indicate that a token holder has standing and to whose complaints about a flow of conduct a lawmaker will give ear (Cell 'A6')? From a factual point of view, death that results from killing is not a benefit to the victim — in most circumstances. When the flow of conduct will harm a recipient, there is a factual disincentive to exercise any right that a recipient may hold. Therefore, it would be meaningless for a lawmaker to confer a right to be killed on a victim who does not want to be killed. Therefore, the lawmaker will perhaps look to the prosecutor's office of her government to see that the warriors do their job and hence the lawmaker gives the prosecutor the right that the victims shall die (Cell 'A6'). This is an instance of extrapolation. The prosecutor is neither the source of killing nor the recipient of the consequences of killing. When a lawmaker binds a token to someone other than a source or a recipient, an extrapolation has taken place.
A Row ‘B’ lawmaker holds the opinion that she is indifferent to killing (Cell 'B3'). This is the neutral position, the lawmaker being neither ‘for’ nor ‘against’ killing. From an opinion of indifference no desire springs (Cell 'B4'). Absent is a desire to turn killing on. Absent is a desire to turn killing off. A lawmaker has no objection to either polarity of conduct (Cell 'B4'). On or off, it is all the same to the lawmaker. The lawmaker expresses her lack of desire by issuing a permission allowing either positive or negative conduct (Cell 'B5'). The permission is "Thou may kill or not kill as you please." Simultaneously, with the issuance of the permission, “Thou may kill or not kill”, a lawmaker binds the permission to token holders allocating both weight (Column 1) and standing (Column 7) both of which, by the way, are absent in a permission. With regard to weight, a lawmaker binds the permission to a weight token holder by handing him or her a privilege (Cell 'B2'). The absence of weight is felt as a privilege to kill or not kill (Cell 'B2'). The effect of the permission is to free the killer from the burden of the weight of a lawmaker. The source has leeway, the freedom to do or not to do as the source decides not as the government decides. With regard to standing, a lawmaker binds the permission to a standing token holder by handing him or her a no-right (Cell 'B6'). The absence of standing is felt as a no-right to be killed or not killed. A lawmaker will pay no attention to the complaints of a standing token holder with regard to a flow of conduct who holds a no-right. The holder of a no-right is invisible to a lawmaker and to him or her no ear will be given.
A Row ‘C’ lawmaker holds the opinion that she dislikes killing (Cell 'C3'). The opinion prompts a lawmaker to desire to turn off the flow of killing from killer to victim (Cell 'C4') and to express this desire with the issuance of a command against killing i.e., that the conduct be off . The command is "Thou shall not kill" (Cell 'C5'). It is a command for ‘negative’ or ‘off’ conduct. Simultaneously, with the issuance of the command, “Thou shall not kill”, a lawmaker binds the command to token holders allocating both weight (Column 1) and standing (Column 7) which, by the way, are both present in a command. With regard to weight, a lawmaker binds the command to a weight token holder by handing him or her a duty (Cell 'C2'). The weight of the lawmaker is felt as a duty not to kill (Cell 'C2'). With regard to standing, a lawmaker binds the command to a standing token holder by handing him or her a right (Cell 'C6'). A lawmaker’s recognition that a person has standing is felt as a right not to be killed. (Cell 'C6')
In summary, any flow of conduct including killing has two polarities: on (killing) or off (not killing). A law that addresses this flow of conduct has three permutations.
1) With regard to the positive version of the conduct (killing) a command is available to the lawmaker to turn it on.
2) With regard to both polarities (killing and not killing), a permission is available to the lawmaker to allow either.
3) With regard to the negative version of the conduct (not killing) a command is available to the lawmaker to turn it off.
A law about killing can be incarnated in any of the foregoing three ways. There are no fourth or fifth ways. The universe of permutations consists of three and only three.
Having run killing through the factual and legal parts of THE TRIANGLE OF LAW®, we can now jump from the level of general to the level of the particular; from a law without circumstances to a law with circumstances. The circumstances are the facts that surround a flow of conduct. They are the context in which conduct flows. It is the circumstances that make one killing different than another killing. It is the circumstances that drive a lawmaker to pick one of the three permutations of a law.
Some killing is viewed as legal — done pursuant to the permission, ’Thou may kill or not kill’. Other killing is viewed as illegal — done in violation of the command, ‘Thou shall not kill’. It is not inaccurate to label those in favor of the permission to kill as on the side of death and those in favor of the command against killing as on the side of life. Our selfish desire to save our own skins tends to make us advocates of life and supporters of the command, ‘Thou shall not kill’. However, as discussed below, some groups are advocates of death and want to legalize specific forms of killing. It is ironic but both liberals and conservatives become allies of death when the circumstances suit them. This can be seen in the American debate over abortion and the death penalty. Let us briefly examine these two types of killing.
One of the factual parts of a law is the recipient of consequences of conduct. In the case of killing, the particular name for a recipient is the victim. Killing earns the name abortion when the age of victim is between conception and birth. Other types of killings where the age of the victim is a significant enough characteristic to earn it its own name are infanticide (the victim is born but young) and euthanasia (the victim is old).
A lawmaker can address the flow of conduct known as abortion with any of three permutations of a law. The three permutations are
1) the command for negative conduct, “Thou shall not kill”,
2) the permission “Thou may kill or not kill”, and
3) the command for positive conduct, “Thou shall kill”.
However, in the debate over abortion in the United States, no faction advocates that the command for positive conduct, ‘Thou shall kill” ought to be the law of the land. The issue is between those who advocate the command for negative conduct, “Thou shall not kill” versus those who advocate the permission “Thou may kill”.
With a permission, the decision to turn a flow of conduct on or off shifts from a lawmaker to whomever is designated as the holder of the privilege token. The privilege holder gets to make the choice about the polarity of conduct – being either off or on. The lawmaker does not substitute its own decision for the decision of the privilege holder. This is true anytime a lawmaker issues a permission. The propagandists for those who favor the permission to kill in the context of abortion have seized upon this aspect of lawmaking and use it as their rallying cry calling themselves pro-choice. The significance of a permission is that the mother makes the decision not the government.
With a command, decision making shifts to a lawmaker from whomever is designated as the holder of the duty token. The duty holder does not get to make the choice about the polarity of conduct. The lawmaker substitutes its own decision for the decision of the duty token holder. This is true anytime a lawmaker issues a command. The significance of a command is that the government makes the decision not the mother.
The abortion debate can be examined from the perspective of both weight and standing. In terms of the weight of a law and assuming the weight token holder is the mother not anyone else, the issue is whether a lawmaker binds a duty not to kill or a privilege to kill to a mother. If the weight token holder is not the mother but a physician, the issue becomes whether a lawmaker binds a duty or privilege to a physician. In terms of the standing of a law and assuming the standing token holder is the baby, the issue is whether a lawmaker binds a right not to be killed or a no-right not to be killed to the baby.
Let us examine more closely the distinguishing circumstance of abortion: that the victim is below a designated age.
Even the advocates of death by abortion agree that, upon birth, a mother has a duty not to kill her baby. It is the period of human life before birth that is significant in the abortion debate. The advocates of death favor a period of vulnerability during which a mother has the privilege to kill her baby. The advocates of life oppose a period of vulnerability. They hold the opinion that a mother has a duty not to kill her baby even though the baby has not yet progressed to birth. Keep in mind that the phrase "period of vulnerability" has both factual and legal connotations. It is called a period of vulnerability because, during it, a baby has no-right to life and a mother has a privilege to kill. However, to be a period, it must have a beginning and an end and they must be fixed in "the factual". The beginning is easy and that is conception. However, within the debate for and against a period of vulnerability is a sub-debate over where to locate the end point of the period of vulnerability. The end point is a turning point. It is a location in the life of a baby where the mother's privilege to kill her baby turns into a duty not to kill. At the turning point, the period of vulnerability ends and a period of invulnerability begins. The advocates of life hold the opinion that the turning point is the moment of conception. There is no period of vulnerability. The advocates of death hold the opinion that the end point is somewhere further into the life of a baby somewhere between conception and birth.
In evaluating the merits and demerits of an abortion law, one must ask why does a human who has escaped the period of vulnerability deserve a right to life while a human still trapped within the period of vulnerability is unworthy of it ? What changes? What happens at the turning point that makes a lawmaker who has withheld his protection from a baby suddenly give a baby protection? Why treat a mother differently who kills her baby after the period of vulnerability ends - a horror viewed as the ultimate betrayal and perfidy - than during the vulnerability period? These are the hard questions that THE TRIANGLE OF LAW® can only raise but cannot answer.
Let us now re-examine the abortion issue by making the source of killing be a stranger instead of a mother. Does the stranger enjoy the privilege to kill the baby or is the stranger burdened by the duty not to kill and why? Some advocates of death would set the value of the life of baby within the period of vulnerability to naught. They would extend the privilege to kill to everyone fearing that to claim the life of a baby has any value would jeopardize a mother's privilege to kill her baby. Other advocates of death would disagree. They would say that indeed the life of a baby has value especially vis-à-vis a stranger. Vis-à-vis a stranger there is no period of vulnerability and a stranger has a duty not to kill a baby. They would not want a lawmaker to sit on the sidelines when such a killing occurs. Only the mother can decide that other considerations have a greater value than the life of the baby and the lawmaker ought to respect the mother's decision no matter which way she chooses.
In summary, if the abortion debate was looked at as a battle between the advocates of life and the advocates of death, the supporters of abortion advocate the permission, ‘Thou may kill’ and the opponents advocate the command, ‘Thou shall not kill’.
Those who resort to labels classify the supporters of abortion as liberals and the opponents of abortion as conservatives. Yet, it is generally stated that the test that distinguishes a conservative from a liberal is the quantity of governmental intrusion into the lives of the citizenry that the person desires. A conservative wants less; a liberal more. Hence, conservatives favor privileges over commands because with a privilege there is no governmental intrusion into an a citizen’s decision making process. With a command, the government intrudes substituting its opinion for a citizen’s. Yet, in the abortion debate, it is the so-called liberals who favor the permission and the so called conservative who favor the command. Conventional wisdom tells us that the permission ought to be favored by conservatives and the command by the liberals. Labels, I guess, can be misleading.
“Off with their heads” is the cry of the advocates of capital punishment. “Thou may kill or not kill” in the context of the death penalty attracts many to ally themselves with the advocates of death. Death not only counts among its servants the supporters of abortion but also the supporters of capital punishment. When it comes to capital punishment and abortion, their proponents are united as enemies of Life. To them, life is not sacred. “Thou shall not kill” remains the position of the friends of Life.
Let us illustrate the virtue of the three part sentence here.
“Even though a killer is mentally deficient, the government has the privilege to impose the penalty of death if the killer committed a heinous crime” is the position of some who advocate for the death penalty. “If the killer is mentally deficient, the government has a duty not to impose the death penalty, even though the killer committed a heinous crime” is the position advocated by the allies of Life. Notice how the circumstances jumped from the ‘if’ to the ‘even though’ clauses and from the ‘even though’ to the ‘if’ clauses as the main clause changed. This is the formula for showing the opposite position.
In contrast to the abortion debate, in the death penalty debate, conventional wisdom works. The conservatives favor the permission; the liberals favor the command. Yet, now, the conservatives are on the side of death and the liberals on the side of life. Liberals advocate in the context of the death penalty that the victim has a right not be killed, i.e. for a command. Conservatives advocate that the victim has no-right not to be killed, i.e., for a permission.
In the battle between good and evil, there are advocates of death and advocates of life. Oddly, not all mortals support the law, ‘Thou shall not kill.” Some believe that “Thou may kill.” Both conservatives and liberals according to the circumstances ally themselves with Death. Few are — across the board — allies of Life. Many of us presume to have the wisdom to know when it is good to be on Death’s side. Death, however, is not as loyal and often treacherously turns around to bring its erstwhile allies to perdition.